Evidentialism about trust 2. What is more, this kind of epistemic agency is a matter of epistemic evaluation in accordance of which we ascribe epistemic or intellectual responsibility to the hearer. Feldman, R., 2001, Voluntary belief and epistemic evaluation, in M. Steup (ed. Philosophers distinguish two types of doxastic voluntarism: direct doxastic voluntarism and indirect doxastic voluntarism. Thus, my primary concern here are the questions of whether we should trust without evidence or not, and whether we should embrace communicable content as true without evidence or not. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5961-2_8, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5961-2_8, eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0). There is a number of cases in which we, after deliberating over our evidence, decide to trust (or not to trust, or to suspend our trust) other peoples words. Williams, B., 1970, Deciding to believe, in H.E. Doxastic voluntarism and the ethics of belief. View all 15 references / Add more references. Furthermore, I will argue that the main difference between anti-reductivists and reductivists does not pertain to the question of evidence, but to epistemic agency. Trust without any deliberation over evidence or an intentional search for evidence is simply not a general psychological phenomenon. This anti-reductivist perspective has to be distinguished from nihilism. On the contrary, I have found indirect doxastic voluntarism as a compelling alternative. Edited by C. B. Macpherson. Despite some rather explicit claims about epistemically responsible ascriptions of trust supported by the right to trust without evidence, there is still room for alternative readings of this epistemic right. It presupposes causal theories of testimonial knowledge which maintain that the reliability of the procedure of transmission guarantees justified testimonial beliefs (or even knowledge) without any further evidence or evaluation of trustworthiness. that assumes both a (weak) doxastic voluntarism concerning trust and the general framework of virtue epistemology. Direct doxastic voluntarism being that the person has control over some of their beliefs (e.g. However, perhaps the best way to make the distinction between moderate evidentialism and non-evidentialism pertains to whether an epistemic agent can be not only permitted but ought to be. Any situation of trust is thus characterized by the fact that the hearer is in an epistemically risky situation in which she has to make a decision or a deliberate epistemic choice about accepting an informants testimony. However, a different tendency should also be detected in their reasoning. See Graham (1997: 227). <>331 0 R]/P 421 0 R/Pg 420 0 R/S/Link>> Naturally, it would be sensible to object that boundaries between the moderate evidentialism assumed here (the stance that the degree of acceptance needs to be proportional to the degree of evidential support) and non-evidentialism (which claims that trust neednt, be based on evidence, nor proportioned to the strength of the evidence) can be quite blurry. 1 To substantiate (partial) direct doxastic voluntarism it would seem necessary to exhibit plausible examples of beliefs that are formed by direct volition-driven causation. Graham explicitly writes that it is only in everyday situations that we can assume the reliability of testimony because participants in communication have shared aims, and do in fact rely upon each other and check up on each other with some degree of frequency. 15 It ought to be stressed that I have omitted two important questions: (i) the extent of our voluntary control over our responses to reasons for trusting, as well as the (ii) particular nature of what can be considered an appropriate reason (in the lights of which our virtuous intellectual character can be assessed). Descartes and the Question of Direct Doxastic Voluntarism. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. This book presents seventeen new essays on these questions, drawing together perspectives from philosophy and psychology. Direct Doxastic Voluntarism the notion that we have di- rect (un-mediated) voluntary control over our beliefs has widely been held to be false. In the second part, I will argue that the position taken by anti-reductivists is not necessarily an anti-evidentialist position. A few minutes later, however, I might find myself in the non-ordinary context of hearing about a crash on her line on the radio. Prince 14.2 (www.princexml.com) Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books. Therefore, (1) anti-reductionism or doxastic involuntarism concerning trust is neither a necessary nor a particularly reasonable explanation of the phenomenology of trust and (2) agency evidentialism is methodically superior to doxastic involuntarism insofar as it offers a unified theory about trust. 6 0 obj On the other hand, the anti-reductivist stance could be read in the following, more moderate manner: (i) we have an epistemic right to trust without conclusive evidence; (ii) we have an epistemic right to trust without a posteriori evidence (appealing to an a priori justification of testimony in general); (iii) we have an epistemic right to trust without local evidence about a particular testimony (appealing to global, but a posteriori justifications of testimony in general); (iv) we have an epistemic right to trust without additional positive empirical evidence in a situation in which there is no cause for doubt or in which there are no undefeated defeater, or like. Doxastic involuntarism crucially rests on the pre-theoretical judgment that any effort to form a belief simply by intending to form it will remain unsuccessful. Initially, Reid himself wrote: [] It is evident that, in the matter of testimony, the balance of human judgment is by nature inclined to the side of belief; and turns to the side of itself, when there is nothing put into the opposite scale. Direct Doxastic Voluntarism the notion that we have direct voluntary control over our beliefs has widely been held to be false. In short, the employment of responsibility by exercising reflective control exists in paradigmatical situations marked by responsiveness to evidence as well as in parasitical situations. Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Locke, J., 1959, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, New York, Dover. A hearer knows that in any testimonial situation she could be deceived and her choice could be wrong. Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books. we hear it, without any additional room for reasoning or deliberating over the evidence as to why we do it. tinct issue is the degree, if any, to which we can voluntarily direct our atten-tion to new evidence or assume critical attitudes toward hypothesis- and belief-acquisition procedures. <>/P 29 0 R/S/Link>> Trust without any deliberation over evidence or an intentional search for evidence is simply not a general psychological phenomenon. In the second part, I will argue that the position taken by anti-reductivists is not necessarily an anti-evidentialist position. Attention, Voluntarism, and Liberty in Descartes's Account of Judgment. In our ordinary dealings with others we gather information without concern for inferring the acceptability of communications from premises about the honesty, reliability, probability, etc. See more in Booth and Peels (2010). Feldman, R., 2000, The ethics of belief, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 667695. DV can be divided into two further positions, direct positive voluntarism . Coady writes that [] the rational person does not believe just any and every thing he is told31 and that [] the attitudes of critical appraisal and trust are not diametrically opposed [].32 P. Graham similarly claims that he usually does not require evidence that someone is honest or reliable, but that he does need further evidence to anchor his reliance on the reports of people who otherwise seem suspicious or unreliable.33, 18Despite some rather explicit claims about epistemically responsible ascriptions of trust supported by the right to trust without evidence, there is still room for alternative readings of this epistemic right. I have attempted to show that even in these (paradigmatical) situations, trust is under the agents reflective control, which is strong enough to treat our trust as something freely chosen. The philosophical principle of doxastic voluntarism holds that people exercise voluntary control over what they believe. This freedom, exemplified in responsible acts of judging, is essentially a matter of being answerable to criticism in the light of rationally relevant considerations. K5KE{'_n_5Apm}]9{WhOoKg'z{j4:rA4+(b5;bCUfvxUfK6H 6L[RG% <> Lackey, J., 2006b, The nature of testimony, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 87: 177-197. While the problem of direct doxastic voluntarism is perhaps more challenging, I am referring to the less controversial stance that doxastic attitudes are in various ways indirectly manipulated and reflectively controlled. <>2]/P 20 0 R/Pg 403 0 R/S/Link>> This reading is called direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV), or direct voluntarism (DV) for short, and it states that we are capable of assenting, rejecting and suspending a judgment based only on our will to do so. <>252 0 R]/P 414 0 R/Pg 413 0 R/S/Link>> Epistemically responsible acceptance of testimony that p is produced by an operation of a subjects experience and additional background beliefs which provide them with a rational motivation for trust that p, even if they are not consciously aware of this operation. It is obviously not a proper description of our epistemic practice to say that trust is forced, or that one cannot inhibit her trust in proportion to the evidence available to her. Doxastic voluntarism: Reflective control, Catalogo dei 614 riviste. endobj Doxastic voluntarism - Wikiwand As can be seen latter, the reason-responsive nature of trust aims exactly to this idea of the cogitative nature of doxastic attitude. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. 28It is suggested that the psychological reality or phenomenology of trust strongly supports the involunarist version of evidentialism, and opposes agency evidentialism. I will accordingly understand evidentialism concerning trust as the stance that epistemically justified acceptance of any testimony is a matter of evidence, wherein evidence is treated as a familiar kind of epistemic reason9: e is evidence for the acceptance of testimony p for the hearer H when e speaks in favour of the acceptance of testimony p. 6In short, evidentialism concerning trust, which I defend here, can be outlined in the following manner: 7E: Trust T to an informant I about proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having T fits evidence S has at t. 8Trust is something we do, not something that happens to us. The alleged phenomenon of immediate acceptance attempts to show that we accept a testimony at. In an analogous context, Alston suggests a similar connection: When I see a car coming down the street, I am not capable of believing or disbelieving this at will, [] when I look out my window and see rain falling, water dropping off the leaves of trees I form the belief that rain is falling willy-nilly. I will accordingly understand evidentialism concerning trust as the stance that epistemically justified acceptance of any testimony is a matter of evidence, wherein evidence is treated as a familiar kind of epistemic reason, is evidence for the acceptance of testimony p for the hearer H when. I will then reflect on my evidence pro (on which rests my previous trust in her testimony) et contra regarding the same testimony, and eventually seek additional evidence about whether her train is really going to arrive at 6.p.m. The version of agency evidentialism which I here support presumes: (i) doxastic voluntarism, or the existence of intellectual freedom in the sense that we have to be capable of certain intellectual choices or decisions, and (ii) virtue epistemology, or the normative approach according to which the target of epistemic evaluation is an epistemic agent to whom we ascribe epistemic or intellectual virtues or vices (epistemic responsibility, epistemic conscientiousness or like. There are, however, two ways to interpret the. This seems to be on par with what, to the best of my knowledge, can be characterized as direct doxastic voluntarism: having the capability to bring about belief directly by means of one's will. Voluntary Control. 4 Such a broad determination of testimony can be found in Frickers words according to which testimony is telling generally with [] no restrictions either on subject matter, or on the speakers epistemic relation to it as well as in Audis words that testimony is saying something in an apparent attempt to convey information to someone else. I consider it reasonable to conclude that the anti-reductivist epistemic right to trust without evidence cannot be interpreted as the obligation to trust without evidence. (Feldman and Conee 2004, p. 83).However, doxastic voluntarism comes in So EV is an epistemic norm that governstwo important forms: direct doxastic volun-our doxastic attitudes including belief, andtarism it and indirect doxastic voluntarism.di-implies that one should believe a propositionrect doxastic voluntarism is the view that we . 25In an analogous context, Alston suggests a similar connection: When I see a car coming down the street, I am not capable of believing or disbelieving this at will, [] when I look out my window and see rain falling, water dropping off the leaves of trees I form the belief that rain is falling willy-nilly. In the case of trusting other people, it really means that we give a hearer the license to be gullible and believe everything that is said to him.
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